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FINE TUNING THE BANK FRAUD
STATUTE: A PROSECUTOR'S
PERSPECTIVE
STEVEN M. BISKUPIC*
"That's where the money is."
-Willie Sutton, asked why he robs banks.'
I. INTRODUCTION
The federal bank fraud statute is approaching its fifteenth birthday
as the financial prosecutor's best friend. Passed in part as a stopgap to a
Supreme Court decision on check kiting, the Statute's broadness and
flexibility have made it the lead charge for prosecutors indicting the
hundreds of federal white-collar crimes that affect financial institutions
each year. In addition, the Statute has met the congressional intent of
combating increasingly complex fraudulent schemes.
At the same time, the Statute is not without its legal trouble spots,
particularly with respect to the "execution" element of the offense.
These recurring problem areas arise under the technicalities of the statu-
tory language, not its general purpose. Thus, the Statute easily can be
modified to eliminate these problems.
Part II of this Article provides an overview of the bank fraud statute.
Part III reviews the increase in bank fraud prosecutions and uses the
charging in two Wisconsin cases as examples of some of the recurring
legal issues that have arisen from the Statute's application. Part IV pro-
poses changes to the Statute to fine tune its future use.
* Steven M. Biskupic, J.D., Marquette University 1987, has been an Assistant U.S. At-
torney in Milwaukee since 1989. From 1987 to 1989, he served as law clerk to Chief U.S. Dis-
trict Court Judge Robert W. Warren in the Eastern District of Wisconsin. Biskupic currently
specializes in the prosecution of financial crimes. His views do not necessarily reflect those of
the United States Department of Justice.
1. United States v. Sutton, 41 F.3d 1257,1260 n.3 (8th Cir. 1996) (involving a robber with
the same famous surname).
2. 18 U.S.C. § 1344 (1998) (hereinafter "the Statute").
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II. THE BANK FRAUD STATUTE
A. Enactment
In 1982, the Supreme Court, in United States v. Williams,3 held that
check kiting4 could not be prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 1014, which
criminalizes false statements to financial institutions.5 In so doing, the
Court reasoned that the presentment of a check to a bank did not con-
stitute a representation that sufficient funds existed in the account to
cover the check.6
On October 12, 1984, Congress responded by enacting Title 18, §
1344, which criminalized "schemes" directed at federally insured finan-
cial institutions.7 The Statute is modeled after the federal mail and wire
fraud statutes, which outlawed "schemes to defraud" that are furthered
through the use of the U.S. mails or interstate wire communications.8
The Statute's primary purpose was to allow the federal prosecution of
check kites.9
At the same time, Congress sought to create a statute that would ad-
dress what it saw as increasingly complex frauds aimed at financial insti-
tutions. '° Prior to the enactment of 18 U.S.C. § 1344, statutes prohibit-
ing crimes against financial institutions focused on particular and
distinct acts-usually an affirmative false statement. For example, fed-
3. 458 U.S. 279,290 (1982).
4. Check kiting consists of drawing checks on an account in one bank and depositing
them in an account in a second bank when neither account has sufficient funds to cover the
amounts drawn. Just before the checks are returned for payment to the first bank, the kiter
covers them by depositing checks drawn on the account in the second bank. Due to the delay
created by the collection of funds by one bank from the other, known as float time, an artifi-
cial balance is created. See, e.g., United States v. Stone, 954 F.2d 1187, 1188, n.1 (6th Cir.
1992).
5. See Williams, 458 U.S. at 284-85.
6. See id. at 290.
7. See 18 U.S.C. § 1344; Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984-Part G, Bank
Fraud, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. (98 Stat.) 2147; see also United States v. Do-
herty, 969 F.2d 425 (7th Cir. 1992); Stone, 954 F.2d at 1189-90; United States v. Young, 952
F.2d 1252, 1255-56 (10th Cir. 1991).
8. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341,1343 (1998); see also United States v. Lilly, 983 F.2d 300, 303-04
(1st Cir. 1992); United States v. Stavroulakis, 952 F.2d 686, 694 (2d Cir. 1992).
9. See Doherty, 969 F.2d at 429.
10. See il; Stone, 954 F.2d at 1989-90; Young, 952 F.2d at 1255-56; see also Comprehen-
sive Crime Control Act at 3518 ("The scope of the present Federal statutes is not sufficient to
assure effective prosecution of the range of fraudulent crimes commonly committed today
against financial institutions.").
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eral law prohibited the false certification of a check," false bank en-
tries,' and false statements on a loan application, 3 though the precise
statute at issue depended on the type of federal insurance or backing
carried by the financial institution.4 The new statute took a broader
view of criminal conduct and focused on the overall deceptive activity
aimed at the financial institution.5
B. Statutory Language
When first passed, the Statute read as follows:
(a) Whoever knowingly executes or attempts to execute, a
scheme or artifice-
(1) to defraud a federally chartered or insured financial insti-
tution; or
(2) to obtain any of the moneys, funds, credits, securities, or
other property owned by or under the custody or control of a
federally chartered or insured institution by means of false or
fraudulent pretenses, representations or promises, shall be
fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned not more than
five years, or both.
(b) As used in this section, the term "federally chartered or in-
sured financial institution" means-
(1) a bank with deposits insured by the Federal Deposit In-
surance Corporation;
(2) an institution with accounts insured by the Federal Sav-
ings and Loan Insurance Corporation;
(3) a credit union with accounts insured by the National
Credit Union Administration Board;
(4) a Federal home loan bank or a member, as defined in sec-
tion 2 of the Federal Home Loan Bank Act (12 U.S.C.
§ 1422), of the Federal home loan bank system; or
(5) a bank, banking association, land bank, intermediate
credit banking bank for cooperatives, production credit asso-
ciation, land bank association, trust company, mortgage asso-
11. See 18 U.S.C. § 1004 (1985).
12. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1005,1006 (1985).
13. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1011, 1013,1014 (1985).
14. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1011, 1013,1014 (1985).
15. See United States v. Hammen, 977 F.2d 379, 383 (7th Cir. 1992); see also United
States v. Brandon, 17 F.3d 409, 426 (1st Cir. 1994); United States v. Barnhart, 979 F.2d 647,
651 (8th Cir. 1992).
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ciation savings bank, or other banking or financial institution
organized or operating under the laws of the United States.16
Two amendments followed, one in 1989 and another in 1990.17 They
combined to streamline the statutory language by defining "financial in-
stitution" and by dramatically increasing the statutory penalty.18 While
the original Statute listed the various ways that a financial institution
could be federally insured or backed, such as through FDIC insurance,
the present version uses only "financial institution," but defines the term
in detail elsewhere in the criminal code.19 Also, when the Statute was
first enacted, it carried a maximum penalty of five years imprisonment
or a fine of not more than $10,000 or both; the 1989 amendment in-
creased the maximum penalty to twenty years imprisonment and a fine
of $1,000,000;' the 1990 amendment increased the maximum imprison-
ment to thirty years.1
The current version reads as follows:
Whoever knowingly executes, or attempts to execute, a scheme
or artifice-
(1) to defraud a financial institution; or
(2) to obtain any of the moneys, funds, credits, assets, securi-
ties, or other property owned by or under the custody or con-
trol of, a financial institution, by means of false or fraudulent
pretenses, representations or promises; shall be fined not
more than $1,000,000 or imprisoned not more than 30 years,
or both. 2
Two distinct, though overlapping offenses, exist under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1344.' Subsection (1) outlaws "schemes to defraud," and is estab-
lished by proof of a pattern of conduct designed to deceive a financial
16. 18 U.S.C. § 1344 (1985).
17. See 18 U.S.C. § 1344 (1990); 18 U.S.C. § 1344 (1991); Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat.
183 (1989) and Pub. L. No. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4789 (1990).
18. See id.
19. See 18 U.S.C. § 1344 (1985); see also 18 U.S.C. § 20 (1998).
20. See 18 U.S.C. § 1344 (1991).
21. See id.
22. 18 U.S.C. § 1344 (1998).
23. See United States v. Mueller, 74 F.3d 1152, 1159 (11th Cir. 1996); United States v.
LeDonne, 21 F.3d 1418, 1426-27 (7th Cir. 1994). While the single statute defines two separate
offenses, an indictment may conjunctively charge both offenses in a single count. See Le-
Donne, 21 F.3d at 1427.
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institution.24 Subsection (2) prohibits schemes to obtain money (or
credits, assets, etc.) through false pretenses, representations or prom-
ises' While the two subsections share common elements and overlap-
ping proof,' the necessity of an affirmative misrepresentation under
subsection (2) distinguishes the two provisions.' Because of this latter
characterization, subsection (2) charges remain open to the type of
challenge upheld by the Supreme Court in Williams, where the Court
held that the presentment of a check did not involve a representation as
to the account balance.2' Also, because of the pluralization of the terms
under subsection (2), at least one court has considered, but not resolved,
whether multiple false pretenses, representations, or promises need to
be proved in order to establish the "scheme" element.29
Subsection (2) is almost considered a clarification of subsection (1)20
That is, a scheme to obtain money through false pretenses is considered
just one of the ways a scheme to defraud can be carried out.3' Given the
broader application of subsection (1), the primary focus of judicial re-
view of 18 U.S.C. § 1344 schemes has been on the "scheme to defraud"
element.
C. Schemes to Defraud
Courts have applied a broad, fact-based analysis to determine what
constitutes a scheme to defraud. As one court has noted, "[t]he courts
have traditionally been wary of defining fraud for fear of creating op-
portunities for, or encouraging the creation of, dishonest schemes that
lie outside the definition. Consequently, case law on fraud is highly fact-
bound and broad statements must be read in context.3 12 Perhaps the
24. See LeDonne, 21 F3d at 1426-27; United States v. Ragosta, 970 F.2d 1085, 1089 (2d
Cir. 1992).
25. See United States v. Blackburn, 9 F3d 353,356 (5th Cir. 1993); Ragosta, 970 F.2d at
1088.
26. See United States v. Young, 952 F.2d 1252, 1256 (10th Cir. 1991); United States v.
Medeles, 916 F.2d 195,198 (5th Cir. 1990).
27. See LeDonne, 21 F.3d at 1426-27; Blackburn, 9 F.3d at 356.
28. See Williams v. United States, 458 U.S. at 284-85 (1982); see also United States v.
Schwartz, 899 F.2d 243,246 (3rd Cir. 1990).
29. See United States v. Puerta, 38 F.3d 34, 39 (1st Cir. 1994); United States v. Lilly, 983
F.2d 300,305 n.10 (1st Cir. 1992).
30. See United States v. Monostra, 125 F.3d 183, 186 (3rd Cir. 1997).
31. For example, the pattern jury instructions of the Seventh Circuit define "scheme to
defraud" as one involving "false pretenses, representations, or promises." See 2 FEDERAL
CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 90 (1984).
32. United States v. Mueller, 74 F.3d 1152,1159 (11th Cir. 1996).
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most common broad recitation of fraud comes from the Third Circuit,
which held that a scheme to defraud is conduct that demonstrates "a de-
parture from fundamental honesty, moral uprightness, or fair play and
candid dealings in the general life of the community." 3  Almost as broad
is the definition of fraud as acts designed "to deceive or cheat, usually
for the purpose of getting financial gain for one's self or causing finan-
cial loss to another."'
In an indictment, a scheme to defraud is usually defined by one or
more acts of deception, 35 though only one such deceptive act is necessary
to prove the scheme element at trial.36 Moreover, "each individual com-
ponent of the scheme need not be illegal in order to find a scheme to de-
fraud. It is sufficient that the whole scheme involve fraudulent con-
duct."'  While the scheme normally has a financial component, it may
also include depriving the financial institution of its right to the honest
services of its employees.38
The victim of the scheme must be a financial institution,39 though
other individuals or entities may be victimized under the scheme at the
same time.4° "Financial institution" is defined under 18 U.S.C. § 20 to
include the following: banks insured by the FDIC, credit unions insured
by the NCUSIF, Federal home loan banks, Farm Credit institutions,
small business investment companies under the Small Business Invest-
ment Act, Federal Reserve banks, and branches or agencies of foreign
banks.4'
The financial institution need not suffer an actual loss as a result of
the scheme to defraudY. It is enough that the bank is put at risk as part
33. United States v. Goldblatt, 813 F.2d 619, 624 (3rd Cir. 1987). See also Monostra, 125
F.3d at 186; United States v. Norton, 108 F.3d 133, 135 (7th Cir. 1997); Mueller, 74 F.3d at
1159; United States v. Sheahan, 31 F.3d 595, 600 (8th Cir. 1994); United States v. Brandon, 17
F.3d 409, 424 (1st Cir. 1994); United States v. Ragosta, 970 F.2d 1085, 1090 (2d Cir. 1992).
34. United States v. Moede, 48 F.3d 238, 241 (7th Cir. 1995); see also United States v.
Pribble, 127 F.3d 583, 592 (7th Cir. 1997); United States v. Pettigrew, 77 F.3d 1500, 1513 (5th
Cir. 1996).
35. See United States v. Hammen, 977 F.2d 379, 383 (7th Cir. 1992); 2 FEDERAL
CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 90 (1984).
36. See United States v. Cloud, 872 F.2d 846,851 (9th Cir. 1989).
37. Goldblatt, 813 F.2d at 624 (quoting United States v. Feldman, 711 F.2d 758, 764 (7th
Cir. 1983)).
38. See Hammen, 977 F.2d at 385.
39. See, e.g., Moede, 48 F.3d at 241-42.
40. See United States v. Barakett, 994 F.2d 1107, 1111 (5th Cir. 1993).
41. See 18 U.S.C. § 20 (1998).
42. See United States v. Solomonson, 908 F.2d 358,364 (8th Cir. 1990) (citing cases).
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of the scheme.43 Also, "it is the financial institution[,] ... not its officers
or agents, that is the victim" of violations of the bank fraud statute.4
Thus, it is not a valid defense that a bank official may have been aware
of the scheme, or even involved in it.45
D. "Execution" of the Scheme
The "execution" is the unit of prosecution for bank fraud offenses
and must be alleged as a separate essential element.' Unlike the mail
and wire fraud statutes, which define "executions" in terms of mailings
or interstate telephone calls that further the scheme, 18 U.S.C. § 1344
carries no inherent definition.47 Therefore, the execution element has
been the subject of much judicial inquiry, but no court has set a consis-
tent judicial definition.
In the Statute's early applications, courts combined the scheme as-
pect and execution aspect into a single element.4 Such a conclusion was
not unfounded, because "actions that prove the existence of the scheme
will often be actions taken in execution of the scheme."49 In check kite
prosecutions, for example, the execution was identified as each writing
of a worthless check. °
But in United States v. Lemons," the Fifth Circuit struck down a
multi-count conviction in a loan fraud case. 2 Finding that the various
executions were simply separate acts in furtherance of a single scheme,
the court held that the indictment was multiplicitious-that is, it divided
a single offense into multiple counts and penalties. 3 The court's analysis
included reviewing the few then-existing decisions dealing with execu-
tion, distinguishing the executions of the mail and wire fraud statutes,
43. See United States v. Young, 952 F.2d 1252,1257 (10th Cir. 1991).
44. United States v. Saks, 964 F.2d 1514,1518 (5th Cir. 1992).
45. See United States v. Hammen, 977 F.2d 379 (7th Cir. 1992).
46. See United States v. Longfellow, 43 F.3d 318,323 (7th Cir. 1994).
47. See 18 U.S.C. § 1344 (1998).
48. See United States v. Sims, 895 F.2d 326, 329 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Solo-
monson, 908 F. 2d 358, 364 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v. Taggatz, 831 F.2d 1355, 1358 (7th
Cir. 1987).
49. Hammen, 977 F.2d at 383.
50. See United States v. Poliak, 823 F.2d 371,372 (9th Cir. 1987).
51. 941 F.2d 309 (5th Cir. 1991).
52. See id. at 313-18.
53. See id. at 318. The separate executions consisted of acts (1) authorizing payment of a
fee from loan proceeds, (2) funding the loan, (3) receiving a check, (4) receiving forgiveness
of debt, (5) receiving a check, (6) receiving a check, (7) receiving a check, and (8) receiving
forgiveness of debt. See id. at 313.
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and citing the Black's Law Dictionary definition that "to execute"
meant "to complete."' The court then held that the case involved "but
one scheme and one execution" and that each of the charged executions,
"although in several separate stages or acts, was only one part of but one
performance, one completion, one execution of that scheme."'55
After Lemons, courts struggled to synthesize this analysis with the
check kite cases that permitted a separate count for each worthless
check. 6 The findings were fact-intensive, depending on "the number of
banks, the number of transactions, and the number of movements of
money."57 Under this type of analysis, the receipt of funds in a loan
fraud scheme was held to constitute an execution, 8 as was each deposit
of a worthless check. 9 Each time a loan officer gave instructions that a
loan not be repaid was an execution,6 as was each separate sale of an
apartment building.61 However, each separate false mortgage on a single
$7 million loan could not be alleged as a separate execution.6 2 In addi-
tion, despite the holding in Lemons, another court held that each sepa-
rate deposit and transfer of money, similar to that in Lemons, could be a
separate execution.'
At best, the present consensus of the courts appears to be that each
part of the scheme that creates a separate financial risk for the financial
institution constitutes a separate execution64 Thus, "[e]ach time an
identifiable sum of money is obtained by a specific fraudulent transac-
tion, there is likely to be a separate execution of the scheme."6 Such
conduct usually brings the scheme to fruition by giving the defendant
use of the ill-gotten gains, such as receipt of loan proceeds, use of an in-
flated account balance, credit for a worthless check, or forgiveness of a
legitimate debt.
54. See Poliak, 823 F.2d at 316-18.
55. Id. at 318.
56. See, e.g., United States v. Sirang, 70 F.3d 588, 595-96 (11th Cir. 1995); United States
v. Longfellow, 43 F.3d 318, 323-35 (7th Cir. 1994); United States v. Mancuso, 42 F.3d 836, 847-
48 (4th Cir. 1994); United States v. Wall, 37 F.3d 1443, 1446 (10th Cir. 1994); United States v.
Brandon, 17 F.3d 409,422 (1st Cir. 1994).
57. Brandon, 17 F.3d at 422.
58. See United States v. Hammen, 977 F.2d at 379-82 (7th Cir. 1992).
59. See Longfellow, 43 F.3d at 324.
60. See United States v. Barnhart, 979 F.2d 647, 651 (8th Cir. 1992).
61. See United States v. Molinaro, 11 F.3d 853,860 (9th Cir. 1992).
62. See United States v. Lilly, 983 F.2d 300,303 (1st Cir. 1992).
63. See United States v. Sirang, 70 F.3d 588,595-96 (11th Cir. 1995).
64. See Longfellow, 43 F.3d at 324.
65. United States v. Brandon, 17 F.3d 409,422 (1st Cir. 1994).
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In a loan fraud involving a single receipt of a lump sum, a single exe-
cution should be charged and the concerns of Lemons will be satisfied.'
But if funds are received in increments, then each separate receipt
should constitute a separate count because of the separate risk of each
payment Check kiting also fits under this analysis, because each
worthless check increases the risk faced by the financial institution.'
Regardless of how the execution is defined, not all relevant execu-
tions must be included in a single indictment. 9 The indictment, how-
ever, should clearly identify the execution that relates to a particular
count, especially because, as mentioned above, the description of the
scheme may include various potential executions.
E. Intent to Defraud
Less confusing is the mens rea element of the offense, which is de-
fined as intent to defraud-acting knowingly and with the "specific in-
tent to deceive or cheat, usually for the purpose of getting financial gain
for one's self or causing the financial loss to another. 7' As mentioned
above, however, depriving the bank of the loyal services of an employee
may also constitute an offense,7 though it is hard to conceptualize how
such activity would not be linked to an intent to seek financial gain or
cause a financial loss.73 This "intent to injure" aspect is what separates
criminal fraud from mere incompetence on the part of a bank em-
ployee.74
The knowledge aspect is usually established through circumstantial
evidence. For example, fraudulent intent can be found when a defen-
66. See United States v. Lemons, 941 F.2d 309 (5th Cir. 1991).
67. See United States v. Hammen, 977 F.2d 379,379-82 (7th Cir. 1992).
68. See Longfellow, 43 F.3d at 324.
69. See Hammen, 977 F.2d at 383.
70. See id at 382; see also United States v. Bruce, 89 F.3d 886, 889 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
71. United States v. Moede, 48 F.3d 238, 241 (7th Cir. 1995); see also United States v.
Pettigrew, 77 F.3d 1500, 1512-13 (5th Cir. 1996); United States v. Clapp, 46 F.3d 795, 803 (8th
Cir. 1995); United States v. Brandon, 17 F.3d at 424. While the statute uses the word "know-
ingly," some courts have substituted the word "willfully." See United States v. Pribble, 172
F.3d 583, 592 (7th Cir. 1997); Moede, 48 F.3d at 241. In United States v. Stockheimer, 1998
WL 668820, at *5 (7th Cir. 1998), the court held that in prior bank fraud decisions, "willfully"
meant simply "knowing and purposeful conduct."
72. See 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (1998).
73. See Hammen, 977 F.2d at 385.
74. See id. at 384.
75. See United States v. Molinaro, 11 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding structure of
loan proved intent to defraud); see also 1 FEDERAL CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF THE
SEVENTH CIRCUIT § 6.04, at 86 (West 1980).
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dant opens three bank accounts on the same afternoon for no legitimate
business purpose," deposits a series of worthless checks at separate sites
during a short period of time.' uses checks with fictitious payees and
forged endorsements, 8 or uses false birth dates and Social Security
numbers.79
The prosecution need not prove that a defendant knew that the vic-
tim financial institution was federally insured-or even which particular
bank would be victimized by the conduct. s° In addition, the mere fact
that the fraudulent conduct was not concealed from bank officers does
not mean that the intent to defraud cannot be found.,1
F. Summary of the Statute
Section 1344 was passed to serve as a broad and flexible bank fraud
statute, one that would protect financial institutions from check kites
and complex fraud schemes not covered by other laws. The essential
elements of the statute are these: (1) participation in a scheme to de-
fraud (or to obtain money through false pretenses, representations or
promises); (2) directed, at least in part, at a financial institution; (3) in-
volving an execution of the scheme; and (4) with the defendant acting
knowingly and with intent to defraud."
II. USES AND APPLICATIONS OF THE BANK FRAUD STATUTE
A. The Savings and Loan Cases
The enactment of 18 U.S.C. § 1344 preceded by only a short time the
explosion of prosecutions caused by the massive fraud uncovered in the
Savings and Loan (S&L) industry.' Between October 1, 1988, and June
30, 1995, the height of the S&L prosecutions, more than 6,000 defen-
76. See United States v. Celesia, 945 F.2d 756,759 (4th Cir. 1991).
77. See United States v. Schwartz, 899 F.2d 243, 244 (3d Cir. 1990).
78. See United States v. Sayan, 968 F.2d 55, 61 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
79. See United States v. Bales, 813 F.2d 1289, 1292-94 (4th Cir. 1987).
80. See United States v. Brandon, 17 F.3d 409,425-26 (1st Cir. 1994).
81. See United States v. Saks, 964 F.2d 1514, 1518 (5th Cir. 1992).
82. See 18 U.S.C. § 1344 (1998). The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari to de-
termine whether the bank fraud, mail fraud and wire fraud statutes also require materiality as
an essential element. See Neder v. United States, 138 F.3d 1459 (11th Cir. 1998), cert. granted,
No. 97-1985, 1998 WL 313251 (Oct. 13, 1998).
83. See DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE FINANCIAL INSTITUTION FRAUD SPECIAL REPORT
(1995) (prepared by the Special Counsel for Financial Institution Fraud) [hereinafter
"SPECIAL REPORT"].
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dants were charged in "major financial fraud cases"-those S&L and
other financial institution cases involving fraud or loss of $100,000 or
more; defendants who were officers, directors or owners of the financial
institution; or schemes involving multiple borrowersY Between June of
1995 and March of 1998, another 3,000 such cases were charged.' The
prosecutions were the result of the reported billions in losses arising
from these case6 and involved Charles Keating, BCCI, and a host of
failed financial institutions."
In charging these cases, prosecutors embraced 18 U.S.C. § 1344,
using it to criminally charge such diverse schemes as loan fraud,89 no-
money-down developments,9° manipulation of ATM machines,9 phony
and worthless checks,92 false identities," embezzlement,' and check
kites,95 the offense first envisioned when the statute was passed.
Challenges to the charges (and convictions), in turn, have led to a
number of judicial decisions reviewing § 1344, such as those cited herein.
From these decisions, recurring issues arose with respect to the "execu-
tion" element, including those discussed above. The following analysis
examines the 18 U.S.C. § 1344 charging decision, and subsequent chal-
lenges to the "execution," that arose in two Wisconsin cases.96 The first,
84. ATTACKING FINANCIAL INSTITUTION FRAUD: A REPORT TO THE CONGRESS OF
THE UNITED STATES, U.S. Department of Justice, at 3 (1995) [hereinafter "FRAUD
REPORT"].
85. U.S. Department of Justice figures as of March 31,1998 (on file with author).
86. See FRAUD REPORT, supra note 84, at 3.
87. See SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 83, at 29-62.
88. For example, in the Eastern District of Wisconsin, between 1990 and 1995, § 1344
was the lead charge in more than 100 indictments. The other bank statutes (§§ 656, 657, 1005,
1006 and 1014) combined as the lead charge in fewer than 50 (figures on file with author).
89. See United States v. Wall, 37 F.3d 1443,1444 (10th Cir. 1994); United States v. Moli-
naro, 11 F.3d 853 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Lilly, 983 F.2d 300 (1st Cir. 1992).
90. See United States v. Brandon, 17 F.3d 409,424 (1st Cir. 1994).
91. See United States v. Ragosta, 970 F.2d 1085 (2d Cir. 1992); United States v. Gold-
blatt, 813 F.2d 619 (3d Cir. 1987).
92. See United States v. Puerta, 38 F.3d 34, 36 (1st Cir. 1994); United States v. Hord, 6
F.3d 276 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v. Stavroulakis, 952 F.2d 686, 689 (2d Cir. 1992);
United States v. Schwartz, 899 F.2d 243,244 (3d Cir. 1990).
93. See United States v. Chandler, 98 F.3d 711,713 (2nd Cir. 1996).
94. See United States v. Kay, 83 F.3d 98 (5th Cir. 1996); United States v. Moede, 48 F.3d
238 (7th Cir. 1995).
95. See United States v. Knipp, 963 F.2d 839 (6th Cir. 1992); United States v. Celesia,
945 F.2d 756, 757 (4th Cir. 1991).
96. The author was involved in both of these prosecutions. With respect to United States
v. Hammen, the author acknowledges the input of Assistant U.S. Attorney Eric J. Klumb,
who supervised the prosecution of that case. In United States v. Morken, the author acknowl-
edges former Assistant U.S. Attorney Daniel T. Flaherty, the lead prosecutor on the case.
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
United States v. Hammen,9 became the model for charging in the East-
ern District of Wisconsin.98 The second, United States v. Morken, 9 also
from the Eastern District, recently concluded as the largest bank fraud
in Wisconsin history.
B. United States v. Hammen
1. Background
Robert Hammen was a vice-president and loan officer of University
National Bank in Milwaukee.1® His position allowed him to approve
unsecured loans up to $25,000 and secured loans up to $50,000.Y0I Larger
loans had to be approved by Hammen and either the bank president or
a loan committee.Y2
Victor Detoro and Robert Schafer were two Milwaukee real estate
developers with credit problems.'O° Detoro had been banned from doing
any business with University National Bank because of problems in past
dealings; Schafer had suffered foreclosures on loans from other banks) °
But after Detoro introduced Schafer to Hammen, Hammen funneled
more than $600,000 in loans to Schafer, who then gave portions to De-
toro.'Y5 To avoid detection by the bank's president and loan committee,
Hammen and Schafer used nominee borrowers, falsified financial in-
formation, and ignored bank lending policies.1'
Hammen was indicted on a single count of participating in a single
97. 977 F.2d 379 (7th Cir. 1992).
98. See, e.g., United States v. Giang, 96-Cr-218 (E.D. Wis. 1996), aff'd, 143 F.3d 1078
(7th Cir. 1998); United States v. Moede, 94-Cr-37 (E.D. Wis. 1994), affid, 48 F.3d 238 (7th Cir.
1995); United States v. Akkaraju, 98-Cr-67 (E.D. Wis. 1998); United States v. Homburg, 98-
Cr-120 (E.D. Wis. 1998); United States v. Spillane, 98-Cr-82 (E.D. Wis. 1998); United States
v. Krueger, 96-Cr-160 (E.D. Wis. 1996); United States v. Fuhrman, 95-Cr-195 (E.D. Wis.
1995); United States v. Kielman, 95-Cr-220 (E.D. Wis. 1995); United States v. Loop, 95-Cr-
157 (E.D. 1995); United States v. Zarzana, 95-Cr-83 (E.D. Wis. 1995); United States v. Man-
schot, 94-Cr-163 (E.D. Wis. 1994). All these cases structured the indictments with separate
headings and descriptions of "The Scheme to Defraud," followed by one or more separately
labeled "Execution of the Scheme."
99. 133 F.3d 628 (8th Cir. 1998).
100. See Hammen, 977 F.2d at 380.
101. See id.
102. See id.
103. See id.
104. See i&L
105. See id. at 381-82.
106. See Hammen, 977 F.2d at 381-82.
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scheme to defraud University National Bank.'O' The scheme was cen-
tered around the activities of Schafer and had as its purpose obtaining
loans through deceptive acts.'03 The indictment described in general
terms the series of fraudulent acts that accompanied the loans; with a
single execution alleged as the submission to the bank of a "falsified in-
dividual financial statement" through which one of the nominees (Tim
107. See id. at 382. The Grand Jury indictment read as follows:
From on or about October 8, 1987 through at least on or about December 22, 1989,
in the State and Eastern District of Wisconsin, Robert Hammen, the defendant,
knowingly aided and abetted a scheme to defraud and obtain money by means of
false and fraudulent pretenses from University National Bank, a federally insured
financial institution.
The Scheme and Execution of the Scheme
1. From on or about October 8, 1987, through at least on or about November
15, 1990, Robert Schafer and others knowingly executed and attempted to exe-
cute a scheme to defraud and obtain money by means of false and fraudulent
pretenses from the University National Bank.
2. As part of the scheme, Schafer and others acted and obtained loans through
various individuals and his business called Zil, Inc.
3. As a further part of the scheme, [Robert Schafer], in the course of seeking
and obtaining loans from University National Bank, submitted false informa-
tion and concealed true information regarding the financial condition of him-
self, his business and other individuals.
4. As a further part of the scheme, Schafer and others used nominees to obtain
loan proceeds and conceal lending obligations.
5. As a further part of the scheme, University National Bank was deprived of
the intangible right of honest services of Robert Hammen.
6. During the time of the scheme, Robert Schafer obtained more than $500,000
in loans from University National Bank.
7. On or about December 30, 1988, for the purpose of executing the scheme,
Robert Schafer submitted a falsified individual financial statement for Tim
Laughlin. Schafer then received a $25,000 unsecured loan in Laughlin's name.
Defendant's Actions in Furtherance of the Scheme to Defraud
In knowingly aiding and abetting the above-described scheme, the defendant, while
a vice president and loan officer at University National Bank, took actions including
but not limited to:
1. falsifying information on bank loan records.
2. concealing information from the bank president and loan committee.
3. structuring loans to avoid review by the bank president and loan committee.
4. recommending and approving the disbursement of loan proceeds.
5. depriving the bank of its right to honest services.
All in violation of Title 18 U.S.C. §§ 2,1344, and 1346.
108. See Hammen, 977 F.2d at 382.
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Laughlin) obtained a loan of $25,000.'0°
Hammen pleaded not guilty. He was convicted after a trial (during
which Schafer testified against him) and appealed a number of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1344 issues, including the nature of the "execution" of the scheme.1 ,
2. Challenges to the Execution
The first issue raised on appeal by Hammen was that the indictment
was duplicitous in combining a number of potential executions into the
sole count of the charge.' An indictment is duplicitous if it charges
more than one offense in a single count.12 In a bank fraud analysis, the
issue becomes whether each potential execution of the scheme must be
separated into distinct counts so as to assure there is (a) no violation of
the Double Jeopardy Clause, (b) adequate notice to the defendant of
the nature of the charge, (c) a unanimous verdict, and (d) an appropri-
ate basis for sentencing.1
3
Hammen argued that the scheme to defraud, as described in the in-
dictment, contained a number of potential executions in the single de-
scription of the scheme."' The Seventh Circuit rejected this contention,
holding that the factual allegations that tend to describe a single scheme
may be the same acts that, "if worded and structured differently," might
constitute separate executions."5 "This is hardly surprising," the court
observed, because "the actions that tend to prove the existence of the
scheme will often be the actions actually taken to execute the
scheme."".6 Thus, the government was entitled to charge one execution,
or many, without running afoul of the duplicity argument."7 The court
further distinguished the holding of Lemons, noting that a distinct sum
of money was the object of the scheme in that case."' In Hammen's
case, on the other hand, each set of false documents caused a new loan
109. See id.
110. See id.
111. See id.
112. See id.
113. See United States v. Bruce, 89 F.3d 886, 889-90 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (quoting United
States v. Shorter, 809 F.2d 54,58 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).
114. See United States v. Hammen, 977 F.2d at 382.
115. Id. at 383.
116. Id.
117. See id The defense did not contend that the scheme was duplicitous in combining
more that one loan fraud scheme into a single count. This argument would have been coun-
tered by the fact that all the loans were connected by the same ultimate borrowers and their
total connected balance. See id. at 381-82.
118. See id. at 382 n.5.
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(and new risk) to be issued."9 In addition, the court noted that the exe-
cution itself did not need to be fraudulent only the scheme that it exe-
cuted.'O
Hammen also raised the execution element in connection with his
challenges to the jury instructions. 2' He argued that the jury should
have been instructed that it had to find the particular execution that was
charged, not some other possible execution -that was contained in the
description of the scheme."2 The court of appeals agreed, but found the
error did not require reversal because it was obvious that the Laughlin
loan was the charged execution of the scheme.' 2
119. See id.
120. See id. at 383 n.7.
121. See id. at 385.
122. See id.
123. See id. Because Hammen had not raised the jury instruction issue before the dis-
trict court, the appellate court reviewed his challenge under a plain error standard. Id. at 384.
Hammen also argued that the issuing of nominee loans could not constitute a violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1344. See id. He cited to United States v. Gens, 493 F.2d 216 (1st Cir. 1974), a case
that analyzed misapplication of bank funds under 18 U.S.C. § 656, and found that a nominee
loan alone was not enough to establish fraud. See id. The Seventh Circuit endorsed the prin-
ciple of Gens, but added that Hammen's situation was not similar. See id. In Gens, the nomi-
nee loan transferred the bank's risk from a debtor to a "financially capable party." Gens, 493
F.2d at 222. Hammen's actions, by contrast, had created additional risk under fraudulent cir-
cumstances. See Hammen, 977 F.2d at 384. The court held:
Hammen allowed funds to go to an individual he knew the bank desired to have no
involvement with and falsified and suppressed information on loan applications.
The jury was justified in finding Hammen's activities were intended to cause the
bank to loan money based on inaccurate information, which is a form of fraud suffi-
cient to justify the guilty verdict.
Id. The scheme to defraud described in the case against Hammen also included an allegation
that he deprived his employer (the bank) of its right of honest services. Under 18 U.S.C. §
1346, a scheme to defraud may include those seeking "to deprive another of the intangible
right of honest services." Id. Thus, the actions of Hammen were alleged to have shifted his
loyalty to his friends (the borrowers) instead of his employers, in approving loans in violation
of bank policy. See i On appeal, Hammen challenged the inclusion of this part of the
charge, arguing that since 18 U.S.C. § 1346 was enacted midway through his alleged scheme to
defraud, the indictment was defective. Hammen, 977 F.2d at 384-85. The appellate court re-
jected his argument, holding that as long as the alleged execution of the scheme took place
after the enactment of 18 U.S.C. § 1346, it was not error to include the allegation in the
scheme. Id. In the charge against Hammen, the alleged execution was after November, 1988.
Id.
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C. United States v. Morken
1. Background
John Morken, a Minnesota cattle broker, was alleged in 1995 to have
caused the largest fraud in Wisconsin history.'2 4 A multi-count indict-
ment charged that Morken and three of his employees had participated
in a massive check kite that caused more than $40 million in losses to
Firstar Bank-Milwaukee, Firstar Bank-Wausau, and Farm Credit Serv-
ices of Southern Minnesota in Rochester. Morken allegedly circulated
billions of dollars in worthless checks among the accounts at these fi-
nancial institutions. 125
The accounts were part of a "controlled disbursement" that Firstar
had put in place. "Controlled disbursement" is a combination of ac-
counts set up to maximize the cash flow of a business.12 A check writing
account maintains a zero balance (or a nominal amount) until a check is
presented to the business's bank for clearing. At that time, but not be-
fore, a related account automatically transfers the needed money from a
funding account to the check writing account. The advantage to the
business is that the two accounts are artificially separated to increase
float time, sometimes at separate branches or even separate banks,
thereby limiting the amount of money that needs to be maintained in
the checking account and maximizing the daily use of cash. The deposit
account is usually set up with immediate credit for deposited checks,
also to maximize cash flow.
In Morken's case, his business maintained a check writing account at
Firstar-Wausau, and a deposit account at Firstar-Milwaukee.' He also
had a personal account at Firstar-Milwaukee and a personal account at
Farm Credit Services in Minnesota.)' The indictment alleged that as
124. See Douglas D. Armstrong and Carey Spivak, State's Biggest Theft Alleged,
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Oct. 18 1995, at Al.
125. See id.; United States v. Morken, 95-Cr-178 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 17, 1995) (Record at 1,
Indictment). See also United States v. Morken, 133 F.3d 628 (8th Cir. 1998). Unpublished
documents are referred to by the docket number of the Eastern District of Wisconsin, Record
at -- ; though, as explained at infra note 140, the case ultimately was resolved after a transfer
to the District of Minnesota. The case file was transferred to that district and designated un-
der number Cr 4-96-69 (Rosenbaum, J.).
126. See, e.g., Schering-Plough Healthcare Products, Inc. v. NBD Bank, 98 F.3d 904, 906
(6th Cir. 1996); Orix Credit Alliance v. Sovran Bank, 4 F.3d 1262 (4th Cir. 1993).
127. See Cary Spivak and Douglas Armstrong, How Firstar Says Morken's Funds
Flowed, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Oct. 16,1995, at 19D.
128. See id.; Indictment at 1-5. The allegations of fraud in the Grand Jury Indictment
were as follows:
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"part of [a] scheme," Morken moved checks between the accounts, tak-
ing advantage of the float time, to artificially inflate the actual balances
in each of the accounts.29 As individual executions (and four separate
18 U.S.C. § 1344 counts), the indictment alleged a -particular set of
worthless checks transferring "funds" from one Morken account to an-
other.' For example, Count Three charged as one execution the joint
"preparing, signing and depositing," between May 27 and 31, 1994, of
fifty-seven worthless checks totaling $23.8 million from Morken's Firstar
business account to his Firstar personal account.
6. It was part of the scheme that the defendants wrote, and caused to be written,
certain checks drawn on the SGLE Firstar Account [Morken's business was Spring
Grove Livestock Exchange--"SGLE"] and deposited those checks into the Morken
Firstar Account and the Morken Farm Credit Account. At approximately the same
time, the defendants wrote, and caused to be written, checks on the Morken Firstar
and Morken Farm Credit Accounts in amounts approximately equal to the checks
from the SGLE Firstar Account and deposited those checks back into the SGLE
Firstar Account.
7. It was part of the scheme that the bank into whose account the defendant had
deposited a check, then credited the checking account in the amount of the depos-
ited check, prior to the time the bank against whose account the check was drawn
deducted the amount of the check from the checking account at that bank. As a re-
sult, the defendants artificially inflated the actual balances of monies on deposit in
the Firstar and Farm Credit Accounts.
8. In each case, the checks drawn on the Morken Firstar and Farm Credit Accounts
and deposited into the SGLE Firstar Account were worthless because their value
depended solely on the illusion of a positive balance created by the checks drawn on
the SGLE Firstar Account and deposited into the Morken Firstar and Farm Credit
Accounts; and the same thing was true as to the checks deposited into the Morken
Accounts.
9. It was part of the scheme that as a result of the writing of worthless and overval-
ued checks and depositing them into the SGLE Firstar, Morken Firstar and Morken
Farm Credit Accounts, Morken and SGLE were able to obtain and did obtain mil-
lions of dollars to which they were not entitled and to which they had no legitimate
claim. The defendants made deposits to the SGLE Firstar Account and the Morken
Firstar and Morken Farm Credit Accounts on a daily basis to keep the check kiting
scheme going.
129. See Indictment at 1-5.
130. Id. at 5-10. The indictment also charged a conspiracy to commit bank fraud, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 and three counts of making a false statement on borrowing cer-
tificates, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1014, for a total of eight separate counts. See id.
131. Id.
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2. Challenges to the Executions
Defense attorneys argued that the four executions were multiplici-
tous because of the overlapping nature of the proof on each count.lu
Multiplicity is the impermissible dividing of a single offense into multi-
ple counts of an indictment, thereby exposing a defendant to multiple
punishments for the same offense.133 If an indictment is multiplicitous
and a defendant has received consecutive sentences on more than one
count, then he or she is entitled to a resentencing on all but one of the
counts. 34
The defense also argued that in Morken's case, although none of the
combined deposits was included in more than one execution, they were
part of the overall check kite scheme. Furthermore, Morken attacked
the chronological similarity between the alleged executions (three of the
four executions used the same time frame-May 27 to 31, 1994).35 The
United States countered that this overlap in proof had been considered
and approved by the court in Hammen.
136
The magistrate judge, upheld by the district court, found that the
separate executions were substantively different and rejected the defen-
dant's arguments.37 Conducting a similar review of the diverging "exe-
cution" case law to that undertaken by other courts, the magistrate
judge held, "[e]ach of the challenged counts alleges a separate deposit of
worthless checks and each created a separate risk for the financial insti-
tution involved., 138 The court further noted:
While each of these deposits occurred "between on or about May
27 and 31, 1994," the court cannot conclude they occurred con-
temporaneously. Furthermore, the very nature of a check kiting
scheme involves check transactions close in time.... In addition,
132. See Record at 55, Memorandum in Support of Motion of Defendant Morken to
Dismiss Counts Three, Four and Five of the Indictment, at 3 (E.D. Wis. Jan. 16, 1996). The
issues discussed herein were raised jointly by Morken and his co-defendants and adopted by
each other. See Record at 51, Motion to Join/Adopt Motions of Co-defendants (E.D. Wis.
Jan. 16,1996).
133. See United States v. Allender, 62 F.3d 909, 912 (7th Cir. 1995).
134. See United States v. Hord, 6 F.3d 276, 280-82 (5th Cir. 1993).
135. See Record at 55, Memorandum at 3.
136. See Record at 111, Government's Response to Defendant's Pretrial Motions at 19-
20 (E.D. Wis. Feb. 5, 1996).
137. See Record at 132, Magistrate Judge's Recommendation to the Honorable Rudolph
T. Randa and Order, Slip Op. at 3-8 (E.D. Wis. April 20, 1996) (Gorence, MJ.); and Record
at 146, Decision and Order, Slip Op. at 1 (E.D. Wis. May 31, 1996).
138. Record at 132, Magistrate Judge's Recommendation at 8.
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each joint deposit had its own function and purpose which cre-
ated a separate financial risk for the bank. 9
Morken subsequently pleaded guilty and the issue was not pursued
further.'40
D. Summary
Hammen's indictment was challenged because it contained only one
execution and one count; Morken's indictment was challenged because
it contained multiple executions and multiple counts. While these are
but two of the thousands of 18 U.S.C. § 1344 cases, the fact-intensive
and sometimes conflicting case law on "executions" invites conflicting
challenges, regardless of how an indictment is structured.
These repeated inquiries, however, go solely to the form of the 18
U.S.C. § 1344 charge, not its substance. In the end, as discussed below,
139. lId As an additional challenge to the indictment, defense attorneys contended that
as a matter of law, a check kite could not take place within the Firstar accounts. See Record
at 71, Memorandum by [Co-]Defendant Steven Weiland in Support of Motion to Strike Por-
tions of Count One (E.D. Wis. Jan 16, 1996). Citing to a number of cases that defined a kite
as involving two banks, they argued that since the billions in checks that passed between the
Firstar accounts were all within the same bank, a kite, by definition, could not exist. See id
In response, the government argued the following: (a) check-kiting depended on float, not a
definition of "banks"; (2) 18 U.S.C. § 1344 violations did not rest on a definition of check kite;
and (3) in any event, Firstar-Wausau and Firstar-Milwaukee were two separate financial insti-
tutions under the definition of 18 U.S.C. § 20. See Record at 111, Government's Response at
23-25. The magistrate judge, hearing the pretrial motions, rejected the defense contention on
the grounds that two banks were technically present. See Record at 132, Magistrate Judge's
Recommendation at 16-20.
Although the defendant asserts that both banks share common directors with the
holding company, Firstar, and are included in Firstar's consolidated balance sheet
and income statement, these facts do not establish a unitary operation.... Thus,
this court concludes that the defendant has not demonstrated that Firstar-Wausau is
a branch of Firstar-Milwaukee.
Id. When Morken appealed to a district court judge, that court upheld the ruling and adopted
the government's remaining arguments. See Record at 146, Decision and Order at 1, n.1. Be-
cause Morken subsequently pleaded guilty, the issue was not pursued further. See United
States v. Morken, 133 F.3d 628 (8th Cir. 1998) (government appeal of Morken's sentence). A
short time later, the Seventh Circuit squarely addressed the two-bank argument and held in
United States v. Norton, 108 F.3d 133 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 66 (1997), that a single-
bank kite still violated 18 U.S.C. § 1344.
140. See Morken, 133 F.3d 628. Although indicted in Milwaukee, Morken's case was
transferred to Minnesota pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 21(b). See Record at 146, Decision and
Order, at 1. The government later appealed his 48-month sentence, which resulted in a resen-
tencing and 63 months imprisonment. See Morken, 133 F.3d 628.
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they now help neither the prosecution nor the defense. As such, they
could be eliminated with a simple modification of the statute-one that
results in a single charge for a single bank fraud scheme.
III. PROPOSED CHANGES TO § 1344: ELIMINATING THE "EXECUTION"
Hammen, Morken, and the other thousands of bank fraud cases have
established that 18 U.S.C. § 1344 has served its congressional purpose in
criminalizing not only check kites, but the variety of complex schemes
contemplated by those seeking to cheat federally insured banks. But the
litigation of these cases suggests that a simple amendment eliminating
the "execution" language would do away with much of the unneeded,
and ultimately irrelevant, analysis of that element of the statute. Such a
change is appropriate because of three factors: (1) The execution ele-
ment adds nothing in the way of criminal culpability; (2) the thirty-year
statutory maximum, combined with the federal sentencing guidelines,
has made it almost impossible for any bank fraud defendant to warrant a
sentence of more than thirty years; and (3) the charging of multiple
counts of bank fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1344 results in unnecessary liti-
gation.
A. Criminal Culpability
As explained above, the bank fraud statute was modeled after the
mail and wire fraud statutes, both of which use "execution" in connec-
tion with the use of the mails or an interstate wire communication in fur-
therance of the scheme to defraud. 4' But these elements are merely ju-
risdictional, providing a basis for federal intervention into otherwise
local frauds.'42 With the bank fraud statute, however, the federal juris-
diction is provided by the federal backing of the financial institutions
(such as through FDIC insurance). Thus, the "execution" is not a juris-
dictional element.
The use of "execute" in 18 U.S.C. § 1344 also cannot be said to be a
congressional intent to cover only those schemes to defraud that are
brought to completion, 43 because the Statute penalizes attempts as
141. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and 1343 (criminalizing participation in a scheme by those
who, "for the purpose of executing such scheme," use the Postal Service or overnight carrier
or engage in an interstate wire. communication). Id
142. See, e.g., United States v. Walters, 997 F.2d 1219, 1223-24 (7th Cir. 1993) (reversing
mail fraud conviction of sports agent).
143. See United States v. Lemons, 941 F.2d 309,318 (5th Cir. 1991).
[Vol. 82:381
FINE TUNING THE BANK FRAUD STATUTE
well.1" Furthermore, as discussed above, the "execution" element is
generally considered a part of the overall scheme, and need not even be
a part of the wrongful conduct. Thus, Congress's reliance on "execu-
tion" was form over substance. The litigation that has followed has con-
firmed this as the courts have struggled to define and harmonize the
"execution."
B. Impact on Sentencing
When § 1344 was first passed, the maximum sentence of five years
imprisonment motivated prosecutors to include multiple executions and
multiple counts in order to expose defendants to greater sentences.
Such appears to have been the case in Lemons, where the defendant was
initially sentenced to a thirty-year term based on multiple convictions of
five-year counts, before the counts were reversed as multiplicitous.'"
But the statute now has a thirty-year maximum for each charged
count." More importantly, all frauds taking place after November of
1987 are covered by the mandatory United States Sentencing Guide-
lines.47 The guidelines apply a grid based on the nature of the offense
and the background of the defendant.' 4 For bank fraud offenses, the
applicable sentence is dictated by section 2F1.1 of the sentencing guide-
lines, which uses the "loss" as the primary factor in determining where a
defendant falls on the grid.'49 Also, a sentence imposed under the
guidelines is now non-parolable 5
The practical impact for white-collar offenses is that the sentences
became shorter, but more certain. For example, in the case of Morken,
the cattle broker who committed the biggest fraud in Wisconsin history,
the applicable guideline range was sixty-three to seventy-eight months-
144. An attempt is any substantial step in furtherance of the scheme. See United States
v. Carlisle, 118 F.3d 1271 (8th Cir. 1997) (discussing attempt in terms of bank robbery); see
also United States v. Hord, 6 F.3d 276 (bank fraud charge containing both execute and at-
tempt to execute allegations); EIGHTH CIRCUIT MANUAL OF MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS,
CRIMINAL, at 251-52 (interchanging "execute," "attempt to execute," and "participation").
145. See Lemons, 941 F.2d at 314.
146. See 18 U.S.C. § 1344 (1998).
147. See generally U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (1997).
148. For a detailed review of how the guidelines apply to financial crimes, see Frank 0.
Bowman, Coping with "Loss": A Re-examination of Sentencing Federal Economic Crimes
Under the Guidelines, 51 VAND. L. REv. 461 (1998).
149. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §2F1.1; see also United States v.
Morris, 80 F.3d 1151, 1171,1174 (7th Cir. 1996), cerL denied, 117 S. Ct. 181 (1996).
150. See The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. §3551-81 (West 1998); see also
United States v. LeFleur, 971 F.2d 200,208 (9th Cir. 1991).
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well below the thirty-year maximum of each count."' In fact, under the
guidelines, it is almost impossible for a defendant to receive anywhere
close to a thirty-year sentence. Even a defendant with a series of prior
convictions who causes a bank failure and more than $80 million in
losses will still likely face a sentence below thirty years."5 2 As such, there
is no prosecutorial justification to include multiple thirty-year counts for
a single scheme to defraud unless a prosecutor is concerned about a
challenge to the aspect picked as the "execution."
C. Unneeded Litigation
At present, a prosecutor must choose at least one execution. What-
ever choice is made, litigation will likely ensue. Therefore, in order to
protect against the dismissal of a particular "execution," the careful
prosecutor will include multiple executions and multiple counts. That,
in turn, invites a defense challenge to the "execution" aspect and further
judicial decisions attempting to evaluate that part of the scheme.' 53
This seems contrary to the congressional purpose of having a flexible
bank fraud statute that does not rise and fall on technical aspects. If a
defendant is participating in a scheme to defraud, why should it matter
how or how often he or she causes the scheme to be executed? Why not
simply eliminate the undefined "execution" aspect of the statute and
criminalize "participation" in the bank fraud scheme?
This proposed change would result in a bank fraud statute that
would read as follows:
Whoever knowingly participates or attempts to participate (1) in
a scheme or artifice to defraud a financial institution, or (2) in a
scheme or artifice to obtain money, funds, credits, assets, securi-
ties, or other property owned by or under the custody or control
of a financial institution by means of false or fraudulent pre-
tenses, representations, or promises, shall be fined not more than
151. See United States v. Morken, 133 F.3d at 628 (8th Cir. 1998).
152. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2F1.1 (using a criminal history
category of VI). A loss of more than $80 million adds eighteen levels to a base level of six.
See iL at § 2FR.1(b)(1)(S). Four more levels are added for causing a bank failure, see iL at §
2F1.1(b)(6), and two more for more than minimal planning, see id at § 2F1.1(b)(2), for a
combined total of thirty. Under the corresponding grid, the sentencing range would be 168 to
210 months. Other increases would be possible for a leadership role (§ 3B1.1), abuse of posi-
tion of trust (§ 3B1.3), and obstruction of justice (§ 3C1.1), which could take a defendant to a
level 38 and the 360 month maximum.
153. Although it may not make a practical difference, most defendants may wish to have
their attorneys aggressively attack multiple 30-year counts.
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$1 million or imprisoned not more than 30 years, or both.14
The offense would be reduced to these three elements: (1) participa-
tion in a scheme to defraud; (2) aimed, at least in part, at a financial in-
stitution; and (3) with the defendant acting knowingly and with intent to
defraud.
IV. CONCLUSION
"Broadly speaking, short words are the best."
-Winston Churchill55
Bank fraud prosecutions will continue as long as financial institu-
tions remain the target of white-collar Willie Suttons. Section 1344, en-
acted to combat complex schemes, is an effective weapon. But its statu-
tory language, particularly the "execution" element, has made the legal
aspects complex as well. Elimination of this unneeded verbiage will turn
the courts' limited attention to the crime the defendant has committed-
not the technicalities of how the crime was charged.
154. Left for other authors is the justification for eliminating "artifice" and combining
subsections (1) and (2) into just "schemes to defraud"-two changes that would have no prac-
tical effect on the § 1344 prosecutions, but which would make for a concise statute: "Who-
ever knowingly participates or attempts to participate in a scheme to defraud a financial insti-
tution shall be fined not more than $1 million or imprisoned not more than 30 years, or both."
155. SAFIRE AND SAFIR, GOOD ADVICE 359 (1982).
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